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BEIWEEN 'rHE SPOCIES

Animals can be innocent, though not in
the way that moral agents can be.
So say
Dale Jamieson and TOm Regan in a recent article.[l]
In what follows, I want to examine
what leads them to this conclusion and to
assess whether or not they were led astray.
My ultimate concern is not a critical one,
however.
Instead, I would like to gather
certain elements of a theory of full and
diminished responsibility and try to place
some non-humans within that theory. It is in
these tenns, I believe, that we need to discuss questions of non-human innocence.
In
closing, I offer sane notes on the implications of these points for questions of the
legitimacy of using animals as experimental
subjects.

EDITORS I NOI'E:
The following papers
by Professors Blatz and Sapontzis were
presented at the meeting of the Society
for the Study of Ethics and Animals held
in Los Angeles, california, on March 27,
1986.
These papers were presented in
response to cormnents by Professor Dale
Jamieson.
Unfortunately, Prof. Jamieson I s camnents are not available for
publication at this time.
However, the
follaHing two paragraphs by Prof. Jamieson will serve to set the scene for the
papers by Blatz and Sapontzis:
Three different kinds of arguments are
typically employed by animal liberationists.
First, it is sanetimes argued
that non-human animals are like us in
ways that matter:
they are conscious
beings who can suffer or enjoy life, and
just as it is a bad thing for us to
suffer, so it is a bad thing for them to
suffer.
Second, it is sanetimes argued
that our bad treabnent of non-human
animals is wrong for characteralogical
reasons: it both expresses what kind of
people we are, and contributes to making
us worse.
Finally, it is sometimes
argued that animals are innocent, and so
do not deserve their fate at the hands
of experimenters, slaughterers, hunters,
and so forth.

That's What They Say
So what do Jamieson and Regan take as
establishing that animals are not responsible
for their actions?
The answer seems more
than a bit elusive to me.
However, it might
amount to the following. [2] Non-humans have
no choice in what they do; therefore, they
cannot be guilty for what they do.
Indeed,
it is urged that they cannot be sensibly said
to be guilty.
An alleged irmnediate consequence of this is that they cannot be sensibly said to be innocent either. If non-humans
cannot be guilty, however, they can do no
wrong.
They cannot be faulted for their
actions, and, perhaps as a consequence of
this, they cannot be accused of acting wrongly, either.
Thus, they are not responsible
for their actions, as are moral or, presumably, any ethical agents; they are not liable
to blame or punishment for their deeds. To be
either, as I understand Jamieson and Regan,
they would have to be the proper objects of
treatment inflicted as just deserts for an
offense of which they were guilty.

This last argument--which I call the
Innocence Argument--is one that I have
felt uneasy about for quite sane time,
though in a paper that I jointly authored with Tom Regan, a version of it
was endorsed. In this talk I would like
to dig a little deeper into the Innocence Argument.
In particular, I would
like to see in what sense animals can be
said to be innocent, and try to understand what implications, if any, this
might have for how we ought to treat
them.

Also,
as chronically non-guilty, it
seems they would not be accountable, not such
that they could be justifiably called upon to
defend themselves. [3] No doubt.
Jamieson
and Regan would add that it would not even
make sense to hold them to account, to call
upon them for a defense of their behavior.
But this is not all. Jamieson and Regan
even suggest that as chronically non-guilty,
animals are not responsible in another way:
they cannot even be said to "do wrong. "[ 4]
They cannot even be accorded the status of an
agent of an act that is wrong.
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missed an important sense of the term "innocent. " But should that reply be availing?

Animals, then, utterly lack responsibility for wrong action.
They do not or cannot
deserve blame or pmishment.
They cannot be
justifiably held to account.
Indeed, they
cannot even be the agents of acts that are
wrong.
Absence of avoidability makes for a
chronic absence of guilt. In the bargain, it
guarantees freedan fran responsibility, as
well as freedan fran innocence as an ethical
agent.

Senses and Nonsense
The second canplaint I have enters just
here against Jamieson's and Regan's approach.
We must not treat the issues of animal innocence and responsibility as matters to be
decided by appeals to the various senses of
the words "innocent" and "guilty." In the
first place, and as many have argued, we
cannot make good sense of talk about a sense,
or the several different senses, of terms of
utterances.
And even if we could make sense
of senses, it is a mistake to treat the
questions of animal innocence and responsibility as questions of meanings, as though
the answers to these inquiries are matters of
definition, as opposed to normative theory.
Let me concentrate on that last point for a
moment.

This does not mean that animals are not
innocent in sane other way, however.
Nonhumans can be said to suffer wrong without
deserving it.
And this fact, according to
Jamieson and Regan, gives us another "intelligible sense of 'innocence "' to apply to
animals, namely, that of being the undeserving recipient of harm.
Well, what about all of this? Are non. humans beyond blameworthiness, punishability, accountability, and the perfonnance of
acts that are wrong? Are they such that they
"cannot be innocent (or for that matter cannot be guilty or responsible) in the sense
that moral agents can be said to be"?[S] Are
they innocent in sane other sense, as in
"innocent victims"? There is much to be said
here.

Even if we could make sense of the talk
of different senses and determine how to find
the sense(s) of a term, and even if in following those procedures, we were to end up
determining that in the sense that the terms
"responsible" and "innocent" apply to ethical
agents, they do not apply to non-human animals, the question would still be whether we
ought not change the sense (s) of those terms
and embrace an ethic in which animals are
responsible, guilty, or innocent for the same
reasons as are humans.
Our question is what
sort of ethic to have, one that accords nonhuman animals a place in the arena of responsible action or one that does not.
And that
is a question of basic ethical theory. It is
not to be answered by sane appeal to the
sense of the terms used to articulate that
theory. At least, it is not unless we are to
beg the very question at issue. [6]

Innocence and Guilt
First, it seems highly artificial to
speak of a being's innocence outside of the
context of questions of responsibility.
We
are asked to assign innocence to the undeserving recipients of mistreatment. Children
are innocent victims in war, as are other
civilians.
Non-human animals might be seen
to be the innocent victims of a researcher's
quest for tenure, and so it goes.
Here,
supposedly, we have examples of innocence
where there is no tie to the absence of guilt

or responsibility for wrong acts.
But is
this really so?
What, after all, are we
saying when we claim that someone is the
undeserving recipient of harm, unless it is
that the creature has done nothing to merit
such treatrnent--that is, is guilty of, or
responsible for, nothing which might justify
this harm?
Talk of the degree of innocence
in innocent victims bears this out. Children
and other beings are such completely innocent
victims in war and other life destructive
enterprises, simply because they have done
nothing to deserve their suffering.
No

doubt,

Perhaps, Jamieson and Regan were speaking of senses merely as a matter of convenience, and I ought not hold them to that
terminology or to the attached methodology.
Well then, let my remarks serve only as a
means to focus the discussion.

the reply will be that I have
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Let me take up the question of whether,
in a defensible ethic, animals are (or can
be) innocent, guilty, or even responsible for
wrong acts.
Now, how might we proceed to
answer this question, to select between nonhuman inclusive and exclusive theories of
responsibility?
Any attempt to settle the
problem by an appeal to an ethical standard
BETWEEN THE SPECIES

beings to be responsible for, then, in pursuit of an ethic with point, we would select
that code that most campletely allows us to
serve the purposes for which we have any
ethic with a theory of responsibility.
And
the first order of business would be to state
the point of such codes in a non-question
begging way.

will be question begging. And yet, what else
besides such an appeal would be availing?
Elsewhere,
I have argued that at such junctures we need not resort to caprice but,
instead, can and should fall back, at least
partially, upon pragmatic concerns, taking
what I have called lithe functionalist approach."[7]
In particular, I have pointed
out that if an ethic is acceptable, then it
has point; it has some feature(s) in virtue
of which the code can make some impact upon
our lives. In order to decide between two or
more competing ethics, we then need at least
to identify which has structural features
that will give it point as an ethic. I'Ve need
to select that code with features allowing it
to make all the differences to our lives for
which we might have any ethic.
Not beg9in9
the question in such a procedure, then, will
come out of not selecting codes whose point
is described in ways unsatisfied by the point
of any other ethic.

Let I s try out this approach.
Like Jamieson and Regan, let's ask which theories of
responsibility, animal inclusive or animal
exclusive, do or do not make sense.
The
sense we shall be concerned with, however, is
the pragmatic concern of whether including or
excluding non-hl.UTlal1s will best serve the
point of any theory of responsibility, any
theory of how to justifiably regard and respond to beings in light of their deeds.

The Point of Theories
of Responsibility

With respect to more particular features
by which ethical theories differ, if we are
to decide between two or more ethics on a
functionalist approach, we would decide in
favor of that one with structural features
enabling it to make the particular difference
to our lives that any ethic is supposed to
make by virtue of the feature(s) whose particular shape is under discussion.
And, of
course, in deciding these matters, we must,
in the first place, describe the particular
purpose or the desired impact in question in
a way that does not assume one or another of
the contending ethical theories.

No doubt the point of theories of responsibility will first be sought in the
exacting of retribution or the forward looking enforcement of ethical rules. Isn't that
what any code of justifiable responses to
actions is supposed to accamplish for us, to
exact retribution and/or to enforce rules?
Well, on reflection, it is clear that this
will not do.
As Jamieson and Regan make
clear, there is more to being responsible
than merely being the fit subject of retributive or rule enforcement interference in our
affairs.

In the first place, when we do have
definite specifications of ethical standards,
for example, in the fonn of legal statutes or
recognized moral rules, there is the matter
of being held to account for apparent departures from these.
And the theory of responsibility includes guides for the conduct of
this sort of investigative
interference.
Regulating such interference is part of the
point of such a theory.
At the same time,
however, holding to account is itself neutral
with respect to retributive and utilitarian
concerns in punishment or blami.ng.
After
all, one thing that could be determined when
a being is held to account is that it is not
liable to blame or punishment, that it would
be unjustified or out of place to inflict on
that being a retributive or utilitarian sanction of some standard.
The point of holding
to account is to determine liability, not to
administer the very thing to which agents can
be liable. [9]

Should two theories serve that purpose
equally well, then there would be nothing on
which to base a choice between them.
At
least there would be nothing of a functionalist sort that is decisive specifically with
respect to the feature in question. Perhaps,
more general functionalist features such as
over-all simplicity of application or normative decision making power can be decisive in
such a case. Or, perhaps there is some other
non-functionalist desideratum that will prevail in such a case, something besides a
question begging appeal to conservation of
pre-theoretic, normative intuitions!
(But,
perhaps not.
That is a question for another
time. )[8]
MOre specifically, for ex&~le, if we
must choose between two or more ethics differing in who or what they allow to be responsible and, in what they allow those
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
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to their point, end up treating as ethically
significant their agents living a life of
their own, unhampered by the intrusions (and
worse) of being held to account and blamed or
punished.
They incorporate as a nonnative
background of interference in a being's life,
that this interference needs to be justified
as a response to apparently intolerable behavior, that the being's leading a life of its
own is prima facie inviolate.

In addition, the slightest acquaintance
with the ccmron law will make clear that
often what goes on in proceedings devoted to
the determination of responsibility is really
something different from the enforcement or
exacting of retribution for breach of particular, recognized rules.
Rather, in common
law proceedings or any rroral equivalent of
them, individuals (or, formerly, the state)
are attempting to decide whether the plaintiff has a complaint that merits corrective
action and then to determine just what fonn
that action should take. [10] The attempt is
to provide just relief, if it is deemed that
. there has been some undue hardship imposed on
the plaintiff, where this hardship is defined
in terms other than those of the breaking of
a particular statute or recognized rule.
In
these cases, the guidance in a theory of
responsibility does not regulate responses to
what is generally recognized by some standard
as intolerable. Instead, it guides us in the
determination of what is intolerable and in
providing redress for that to those who have
suffered from it.
Here the functions of
holding to account and meting out dessert
are both present, but, in addition, we encounter the operation of a quasi-legislative
or nonn particularizing and specifying function through which the concrete boundaries of
the intolerable are delineated.

Who Is In and Who Is Not?
In giving this characterization, I have
avoided limiting the behavior in question to
that of ethical agents, of course.
One of
the aims in this circumspection is to avoid
begging the question.
Going a bit farther
afield, however, we can notice that questions
facing the theory of responsibility, in the
case of even human agents, range beyond issues of how to regard and deal with what is
the intolerable behavior of one who is or has
the capacity to be an ethical agent.
The ethical agent is standardly viewed
as one who is capable of recognizing what is
legally, morally, or otherwise expected of
hirn/her and is open to the influence of that
expectation on his/her behavior, through an
appeal to his/her reason. With this in mind,
there are many examples of individuals standardly included within the purview of the
theory of responsibility who are not ethical
agents and who even lack the capacity to be.

Things are much too complex, then, to
simply say that the point of a theory of
responsibility is to provide guidance in
administering retribution or rule enforcement.
(Indeed, they are too complex to say
that the point is to guide the administration
of systems of retribution and/or rule enforcement.)
We would be much better off to
state the point rrore generally as that of
providing guidance in responding to apparent
~ of intolerable ~ and in adjudicat~ disputes ~ just what is intolerable as
opposed to tolerable behavior. Put this way,
the point of theories of responsibility includes all the accountability, blame and
punishment assignment, as well as quasilegislative or nonn specifying
functions
mentioned above.

As we saw, for example, when we hold
someone to account, we might learn that this
agent acted in an intolerable way but did not
do so while open to the rational ~luence of
ethical guidance, did not do so, then, while
functioning as an ethical agent. [llj
Instead, the agent acted while drugged, in a
rage, in a state of immaturity and ignorance
of the rules, or in some other incapacitating
condition. Such agents might well be excused
from blame and punishment, though they are
still considered within the purview of the
theory of responsibility.
They might still
be
considered
accountable,
justifiably
called upon to defend themselves against
blame or punishment.
Thus, here we have
responsible agents who are not and need not
even be capable of being ethical age!1ts.

This statement also emphasizes the responsive character of theories of resp::msibility and in that emphasis, carries the
implication that the agency of those who are
in the domain of responsible action is not to
be interfered with unless that agency has
apparently become intolerable.
In this regard, theories of responsibility, when suited

The same is true with respect to laws of
strict liability, according to which an agent
might be legally subject to fine, or worse,
for consequences of his/her actions, even
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though the act leading to those results was
not perfonned intentionally and in fact every
precaution was taken to avert undesirable
consequences and to follow relevant ethical
guidelines.
Such a one did not act as an
ethical agent in doing what he/she is considered responsible for.
And so, here again,
the point of the theory of responsibility is
to provide guidance in dealing with allegedly
intolerable acts or the consequences of them,
regardless even of whether or not the agent
had the capacity to be an ethical agent in
performing those acts.

act was wrong.
Understood that way, what they have done
is engage in behavior that is de facto intolerable. They have done what is wrong, indeed
are responsible for what is wrong, though
they have not acted as ethical agents or in a
way such that their failure to advert to
ethical
considerations was up to
them.
Still, this is enough for them to be responsible for doing what is wrong.
Indeed, we
take as the ground of our being justified in
acting against them that they are responsible, as agents, though not as ethical agents, for some doing of wrong. We do this,
in this way, continuing to grant ethical
significance to their living a life of their
awn.
It is not that they are worthless
beings to whom we may (prima facie) do what
we wish. It is just that their behavior as a
non-ethical agent is intolerable and something we must protect ourselves against.
This need for protection overrides the significance properly attached to the agent pursuing his/her purposes (and so living) unhampered (a life of his/her awn).
It overrides
the nonnative background condition of theories of responsibility, the prima facie inviolateness of a being's living a life of its
awn.

Clearly,
some individuals, so-called
"moral monsters," for example, also are not
open to recognizing ethical injunctions, in
any way involving an appreciation of the full
weight of the ethical expectation.
Or, if
they can appreciate an ethical injunction,
they are not open to being influenced by it
through an appeal to their reason.
They are
monsters, simply because they are unable to
grasp any ethical calling or only one that
generally would be considered horribly distorted, such as the injunctions of Hare's
Nazi zealot.
Or, if they are able to grasp
the idea that there are, for example, universal ethical restrictions intended for them,
this fact has no significance for them. They
could not care less, as the saying goes; they
are utterly unmoved by such considerations
and what is more, are not open to such influences.

Thus, in dealing with humans, three
sorts of cases arise in which theories of
responsibility would need to guide us with
respect to beings which are not and, perhaps,
even lack the capacity to be ethical agents.
I f a theory of responsibility is to be able
to fully serve its point, and so be acceptable, then it should be stated in such a way
that those who can be responsible for intolerable acts need not be capable of appreciating and being rationally moved by nonnative
considerations. [12]
Adopting a theory of
responsibility that will handle such cases
and the others mentioned earlier will allow
for a wide range of conditions of diminished
responsibility.
Let me now turn to a review
of some of these and to the question of
whether non-human animals might enjoy any of
these types of diminished responsibility.

Unfortunately, the limitations on the
capacities of moral monsters do not always
come with a limit on the impact that these
beings may have on the lives of others.
As
we know, moral and other ethical monsters can
do great harm to others.
They lead lives of
their awn in that they engage in behavior
that is best exl;llained as free, at least to
the extent that it is purposive and involves
them in selectively employing some but not
all of the elements of their repertoire of
behavior in order to bring about certain
consequences. Since these are intolerable to
someone or other, what these agents have
done, then, would be most simply explained as
selecting patterns of behavior whose execution is in fact, though not as a matter of
intent, more or less hannful to others. They
have undertaken something in a purposive way
such that the intolerable consequences would
not have ensued, if they had not acted for
that purpose.
Still, in doing so, they need
not have recognized or even been able to
recognize and advert to the fact that their
BE'lWEEN THE SPEX::IES

Diminished Responsibility
and Non-human Animals
Responsibility, then, might be diminished in many ways below being an ethical
agent fully accountable and liable for wrongdoing.
Conditions of offenders might leave
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their living their own lives.

them accountable but, because justified or
excused, not liable, that is, not blaaneworthy
or punishable. They might be accountable but
not liable, and indeed, so sensitive to being
singled out in an accusation that their accountability is restricted to only certain,
minimally threatening occasions.
They might
be liable to blame or punishment of a slight
degree, for a slight offense, a fate not as
bad as being singled out by accusation and
held to account.
Thus, they might be liable
but not accountable. [13] With or without
accountability, they might be more or less
fully excused for an offense having an exculpating defense or one that gets them off the
hook only partiallYl what I have called elsewhere, a meliorating defense. They might be
accountable for one offense but, because of
having a mitigating defense, they might be
subject to only a reduced amount of blame or
punishment
for another and
lesser
offense. [14] In addition, if they are ethical
agents, they might be more or less justified
in having done what they did and, for that
reason, less or more liable, whether or not
they are accountable to some degree. [15]

And, it is here, at last, that we seem
to find a way for nonhuman animals to have
sane degree of responsibility or innocence.
They are precluded fran failing to confonn to
a standard imposed on them as ethical agents
(and so fran being liable, strictly or not),
and thus they could not give a defense for
failing to confonn.
No difference would be
made, then, by allowing them to be held to
account or to be liable. [16] Jamieson and
Regan were right about that (even if, for the
wrong reasons).
But it does not follow that
non-humans have no place in a theory of responsibility.
Jamieson and Regan were wrong
about that.
As much as moral monsters, nonhuman
animals are sometimes responsible
agents
bringing about what is de facto intolerable.
Let us express this by saying that they are
"performance" versus intentional agents of
wrongdoing or by speaking of their "doing
what is wrong" as opposed to doing wrong.
And, to coin a use, let us speak of their
being "controllable" (as opposed to liable to
punishment) when they are guilty of doing
what is wrong (as opposed to being guilty of
wrongdoing) •

As with moral monsters, agents might be
accountable but not liable, and this might be
for reasons that render them not ethical
agents or even potential ethical agents.
Here, though responsible to a lesser degree
because of not being liable, they are subject
to treatment calculated to control them for
our protection.
And, indeed, this control
might have to take the fonn of killing them.
Thus, while we have here a lesser degree of
responsibility, measured in tenus of a lesser
degree of participation in the system of
interchanges we mark as elements of responsible agency, this is hardily a lesser degree
of responsibility measured in tenus of the
consequences of one's behavior.
Further,
this very same thing can be found in cases
where, because we know the being is not an
ethical agent, we could not justifiably hold
it to account, call upon it for a defense for
not adverting to some nann in its behavior.
Thus, we might have a being that is not
accountable nor even liable but is subject to
protective interferences in its life, on our
part, even to the point of our killing it to
eliminate a threat that is not otherwise
predictably controllable.
SUch liability to
controlling interference, with or without
accountability, is what we shall find in
cases of dealing with moral monsters, unless
we presume to utterly discount their worth
or, that is, the prima facie inviolateness of

With these conventions in place, we may
say that some nonhuman animals, as well as
sane humans, may be accorded the status,
however diminished,
of being responsible
performance agents which are controllable in
the face of their doing what is wrong. Other
nonhuman animals who do no wrong could fail
to be responsible as performance agents in
their various pursuits and on that count
could be said to be innocent. This innocence
goes with their not being responsible as
controllable.
This is not just sanething we can design
conventions to express, however.
Brief reflection should make clear that this is the
appropriate thing to say.
Consider one nonhuman equivalent of a moral monster.
In
particular, I am thinking of those grizzlies
of Yellowstone that, for whatever reason,
seem to have gone crazy. These mad bears now
take to raiding garbage and, in the face of
repeated displacements, return time and again
to taste those forbidden fruits, vegetables,
and other bits of human food waste.
These
same bears also have included in their ways
attacks upon humans. Sane of them are killing sane of us!

9

BEIWEEN THE SPOCIES

Anim~1 Innocence and the Ethics
of Animal Experimentation

Here we have animals with a life of
their own.
They engage in behavior that is
best, i.e. , rrost simply, m:xlestly and powerfully explained as free to th"l extent that it

Having opened the way for talk of animal
innocence within the context of questions of
responsibility, I wish to close with a few
remarks on the ethical implications of what I
have wrought. My answer to what Jamieson and
Regan call "the rroral agent argument" (only
moral agents can be innocent; non-human animals cannot be rroral agents; therefore, they
cannot be innocent) attacks the argument's
restriction of innocence to ethical agency •
Jamieson and Regan were right to balk here.
They were just wrong in why and heM they
balked. But, so what?

is purposive and involves them in selectively
employing sane but not all of the elements of
their repertoire of behavior in order to
bring about certain consequences.
Further,
they are performance agents of what is wrong.
On both these counts, and even in lacking the
status of ethical agents accountable for
their acts, they are just like scme of the
moral monsters spoken of earlier.
To adjust
our theory of responsibility to exclude mad
bears, then, would render it without impact
in important cases of our dealings with humans. This, of course, would limit the point
of that theory beyond our needs.

Does it folleM fran the fact that nonhuman animals can be innocent, guilty, and
responsible for doing wrong that we ought,
other things being equal, or all things considered, to cease experimenting on them? It
is not at all clear why this should be
thought to follow.

On the other hand,
providing ourselves
with the means to deal with mad bears also
will alleM us the way to talk of innocent
hares, that is, of all those nonhuman animals
that have a life of their own but are not
performance agents doing things that are
wrong.
It alleMs us to recognize the innocence and the attendant freedan fran a judgment of controllability of all those nonhumans that are, as we say, just going about
their own business.
To adjust our theory of
responsibility in such a way as to disalleM
the innocence versus guilt of such beings,
heMever, would lead us at the same time to
withhold the status of performance innocence
(as opposed to performance guilt) fran those
humans we might call "llOral benigns:"
innocent children, the Boo Radleys, or others of
the world who are not ethical agents in their
actions and, perhaps, are incapable of being
such, yet who in leading a life of their own
in fact do nothing which is wrong.

In the first place, the world is properly horrified by beliefs that even liability
to punishment justifies use as an experimental subject.
Who would think that performance guilt ensures normative suitability as
a subject or, then, that performance innocence
ethically precludes it?

Further, humans can volunteer for experimentation, even if innocent or guilty. And
in the absence of ignorance or coercion, that
does make them ethically fit subjects, at the
very least overriding any prima facie prohibitions against using them in research. But,
perhaps that is the rub?
Non-humans cannot
volunteer, and without that clearance, we
have no right to interfere with their lives?
Well, if this sort of line is availing, it
works only for those non-humans that can lead
a life of their own.
I t is only these that
were accorded diminished responsibility in my
remarks.

There seems, then, to be a place of
responsibility, innocence, and guilt for scme
non-human animals in ethics that are equipped
to fully serve the point of theories of responsibility •
If such a theory is strong
enough to have point with respect even to
moral monsters and benigns, then the path is
paved for including as well certain non-human
animals, those mad bears and innocent hares
of our world.
This place in the danain of
responsible agency is diminished in having no
part of accountability or liability.
Still,
it is an area in the danain of responsibility
large enough to alleM for a form of innocence; guilt, and responsibility for doing
what is wrong.
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

But what of these?
Having a life of
their own does bring them within the protection of what I called earlier a "normative
background condition" of theories of responsibility, namely, that, prima facie, a responsible agent's living a life o~ own is
ethically inviolate.
If the lives of nonhuman animals enjoy this status, can that not
guide us in decisions as to whether or not to
use the animals in research?
If, prima fa-
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cie, we are not to interfere with an animal's
living its own life--a p:>int we grant in
giving them even diminished resp:>nsibility-does it not follCM that, prima facie, we
ought not to interfere with an animal's living its own life just to experiment on it?

"look first and experiment later"
the rule.

would

be

And which of these is it in the end?
I
must say that it is the second story that
seems most acceptable to me.
I have argued
elsewhere that non-humans lack ethical standing., enjoying for their own lives only importance derivative upon that of the lives of
their human champions. [18] In the face of
that argument, I can only say that non-human
animals might or might not be fit subjects of
experimentation, with no reservations.
It
all depends up:>n whether they do not or do
have human champions.
Still, if I am right,
it is incumbent up:>n the would-be experimenter to check first and experiment only later,
if at all, to weigh the costs against the
p:>ssible gains for all concerned before deciding whether and how to proceed. That much
deference to non-humans with lives of their
own is called for by the nonnative background
of animal innocence. [19]

The answer is just not so clear.
It
depends greatly on why it is that their living their own life is inviolate.
Perhaps it
is because they themselves enjoy ethical
standing and so their leading their own lives
is ethically significant in itself, regardless of anything else.
If that were so,
then, yes, the prima facie inviolateness of
animals ' liVing their own lives would be same
reason against their being used as experimental subjects.
Recognition of the (performance) innocence of non-humans, the fact that
they have done nothing wrong, would itself
raise serious questions about their suitabili ty as experimental subjects. [17]
But what if this were not so?
What if
their living were prima facie inviolate because they have a kind of contingent importance, an imp:>rtance dependent upon the fulfilling of sane other condition, such as the
fact that sane human(s) championed their
cause, urging that they be left alone to live
their own lives?
We could have no way of
knowing without checking whether or not certain animals had a champion, so that the
condition of their lives' importance was met.
Without such a derivative importance, they
might be, prima facie, a fit subject of experimentation, while with it they would not
be. we just would not knCM until we checked.
In those circumstances, we still might grant
that it is prima facie wrong to experiment
upon the animals, at least until we had
looked into the matter of their derivative
importance and determined whether or not they
enjoy the protection of a champion whose
wishes, prima facie,
should be respected.
Perhaps, to avoid a tragic and presumptuous
misuse, as a matter of precaution, a nonhuman animal's living its own life should be
treated as prima facie inviolate?
What if,
that is, their inviolateness were derivative
and first, if not also last, an epistemic
matter?
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In that case, whether or not animals
(prima facie) ought to be used in experiments
would not follON fran their being able to
lead a life of their own.
Instead, only the
ethical need for a certain caution in selecting our experimental subjects would follow:
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should (morally) be treated as ends in themselves, but he (nor anyone else, to my knowledge) has not derronstrated that only mo1.'al
agents should (llOrally) be treated as ends in
themselves.
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incapable of being moral agents, it is at
least doubtful that this entitles us to exploit them.

MDDHSPAH
Wolves
Children of the mJQn
Sired by the night wind
(She tolerates him kindly
as goddesses will
who long for children)
Wolves'
Voices rising
Echo their sire
In rivalry of him
They race across
The rippling snows
In speed and silence
With Her silver
still staining their fur
Lunar gold
Glows through their eyes

Thus, animals' innocence, i.e., their
inability to be fully moral agents, can contribute to answering the "But animals eat
other animals! " objection to animal rights
and can do so without leaving animal rights
vulnerable to the Kantian side of the Dilerrma
of Irmocence. That seems to me how it enters
seriously into the animal rights debate.

Luna weeps for her children
The night wind wails in grief
Humankind:
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